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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS		IN 78592
SECRET (When Filled In)	NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLS NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY	TDCSDB-3/655,517 PAGE 2

NHU SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY.

NHU SAID THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST SUPPORT HIM.

HS/3. BENHU SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRESIDENT IN OR WITH THE ADMINISTRATION, IN GENERAL. ALTHOUGH MANY PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN HANDED TO HIM, HE HAS HAD NO REAL POWER TO FORCE THE PRESIDENT OR OTHERS TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION.

ONLY WITHIN THE PAST YEAR, IN FACT, HAS HE HAD ANY OFFICIAL POSITION, I.E. AS DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

SECRET: NHU SAID THAT THE ARRIVAL OF A NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR WOULD BRING ABOUT CHANGES AND THAT FAST ACTION WAS NECESSARY; IMMEDIATE DECISIONS MUST BE REACHED IF THE COUP IS TO OCCUR. THIS WAS THE ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. THE ARMY MUST SEIZE THE TROUBLE-MAKERS

FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT MUST BE QUELLED. NHU QUALIFIED THIS STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT HE DID NOT MEAN THE BUDDHISTS PER SE

BUT THE FIVE RINGLEADERS, WHO WERE TO BLAME BECAUSE THEY HAD USED THEIR RELIGION TO FURTHER THEIR OWN AMBITIONS AND DESIGNS.

MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LINH, CHIEF OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, STATED THAT SUCH AN ACTION REQUIRED OVERNIGHT; IT MUST BE LIGHTNING FAST AND PROBABLY ALL THAT WOULD BE NEEDED WOULD BE A SHOW OF FORCE. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST TURN THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO CIVILIANS

CONTROL. IN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT FROM MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LINH, CHIEF OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, THAT SUCH AN ACTION REQUIRED

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TDCS DB-3/655,517

IN 78592

PAGE 3

MAJOR DECISIONS AND A PLAN, NHU SAID THAT HE AND HIS WIFE AND THE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD HAVE THE REQUIRED PLAN. NHU COMMENTED THAT HE REALIZED THAT HIS WIFE WAS NOT LIKED BY MANY PEOPLE BUT THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO HELP IN THE FIGHT FOR VIETNAM AND THAT SHE HERSELF REALIZED THAT SHE HAD MANY SHORTCOMINGS.

6. GENERAL LE THEN SAID TO NHU: "YOU SAY THAT YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH ALL DECISIONS MADE". NHU REPEATED HIS COMMENTS ON LACK OF POWER, FAILURE TO HAVE HIS ADVICE ACCEPTED, AND HIS LACK OF OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT.

7. GENERAL LE COMMENTED ON 12 JULY THAT ALTHOUGH NHU MIGHT BE WILLING TO OVERTHROW THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, LE THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT NHU, ADDING THAT ALL THAT THE NHUS WANTED TO DO WAS TO SAVE THEMSELVES. (COMMENT: A PROPORTION OF THE NHU'S CHILDREN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO SAIGON AND WERE UNDER HEAVY GUARD. THE NHUS ALSO HAVE AN ESCAPE PLAN.)

8. BRIGADIER GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU SAID ON 12 JULY THAT ANY COUP D'ETAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AND THAT ALL THE LEADING GENERAL OFFICERS SHOULD COOPERATE.

9. COLONEL LE QUAN VIEN SAID ON 12 JULY THAT HE HAD NOT ATTENDED THE 11 JULY MEETING BUT WAS AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS

GOING ON, ADDING THAT NHU AGREED WITH DIEM THAT SOME CHANGES SHOULD

BE MADE.

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IN 78592

TDCS DB-3/655,517

PAGE 4

ALLIEDED THE IN 1975. WEEL THE COUP D'ETAT WOULD BE MADE BEFORE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE LODGE ARRIVED; NHU, HOWEVER, WANTED TO GO FURTHER AND HAVE A COUP D'ETAT WITHOUT DELAY. VOL VIEN SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICERS WERE LEADERS IN THE COUP PLANNING GROUP: BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING 8 BRIGADES; GENERAL BUI NHANH CHI, 2ND GENERAL, III CORPS; COLONEL HUYNH VAN CAO, COMMANDER, IV CORPS; BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA, COMMANDER, CAPITAL AREA; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS. CINCPAC VIEN MENTIONED ANOTHER GROUP THAT WOULD SUPPORT A COUP PLANNING COMMITTEE PRESIDENT THO IN TEMPORARY CONTROL AS INCLUDING MAJOR GENERAL MIED DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT; BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY; AND TWO OTHERS. ALL BE FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC ARPAF PACAF. PACFLT CONCERNED WITH THE DECISIONS MADE. NHU RELEVIED HIS CONCERN WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE DECISIONS MADE THAT VOL VIEN DO NOT DO THE SAME HE ADVISED THAT THE HVD WOULD NOT BECOME A PART OF THE GOVERNMENT. THAT THE HVD TRIED TO HELP IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION AND THAT HE ADVISED THAT HIS NAME WAS NOT TAKEN BY NHU BEFORE THE THE SCHEMATIC OFFICERS NOTED THAT THE BRIEFED NHU HAD CONCERNED THIS DECISIONS AND VOL VIEN HE AND HIS MILE AND

END-OF-MESSAGE

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